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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010295-CA 
v. : 
ADAM NISH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was a trooper's attempt to frisk defendant during the traffic stop 
justified by a legitimate safety concern, under the totality of the circumstances, 
including defendant's false report of a stolen truck, a suspicious bulge in 
defendant's pocket, his non-compliance with the trooper's repeated requests to 
remove his hands from his pockets, the inherent danger in any traffic stop 
scenario? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue. Underlying fact findings are 
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-940 (Utah 1994). The court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, 
allowing some "measure of discretion^ as regards the application of legal standards to the 
facts. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of 
a school, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)-(b), -
8(4)(a)(ix), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2001), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 2001) (Rl-2). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence (R29-30 (motion), R50-57 (memorandum)) 
(copies are contained in addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing on 25 January 
2001, the trial court denied the motion (Rl 15:24-26) (a copy of the transcript and oral 
ruling is contained in addendum B). 
Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, the paraphernalia charge was 
dismissed and defendant entered a conditional plea to a reduced third degree felony 
methamphetamine charge and was sentenced to an indeterminate statutory term of zero-
9 
to-five years at the Utah State Pnson (R71, 75) (Rl 15:27-28). The trial court suspended 
defendant's prison term and placed defendant on a 36-month term of probation (R72). 
Defendant timely appealed (R79). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On 10 July 2000 at approximately 9:40 a.m., Trooper McMann stopped defendant 
on SR 201 in Tremonton, Utah, for running a stop sign and having no front plate 
(Rl 15:3). Without being asked to do so, defendant immediately exited his vehicle and 
ran toward the trooper in an "upset" and "excited" manner (Rl 15:4). Defendant told the 
trooper that his truck just been stolen (Rl 15:4). Trooper McCann asked defendant to 
step over to the sidewalk and advised defendant why he had been stopped {id.). 
The trooper then asked about the purportedly stolen truck (id.). Defendant said 
that he had argued with his girlfriend and that she took off in his truck: "At the point 
where he was failing to stop at the stop sign, that's where he was coming up to Main to 
try and see which way she had gone. She had turned eastbound" (id.). The trooper put 
out an "attempt to locate" on the truck as possibly stolen, but dispatch advised Trooper 
McMann that the truck was actually registered in defendant's girlfriend's name (id.). 
Although defendant "had calmed down a little bit" since the initial stop, information that 
the truck was registered in his girlfriend's name "made him more upset" (Rl 15:5). 
lThe facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying 
the motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Defendant said he needed to go and find his girlfriend (Rl 15:11). The trooper told 
defendant that he understood his situation and that consequently, he would only give him 
a warning for the stop sign violation: "You had an argument with your girlfriend. Til 
give you a warning for the stop sign violation*' (id.). Defendant, however, continued to 
be upset (id.). Trooper McMann "may have" written the warning at this point, but 
probably had not given it to defendant (Rl 15:12-13). 
Indeed, during the encounter the trooper had also observed a Camel cigarette pack 
sticking out of defendant's right pants pocket and underneath that was a "large bulge" 
that he feared could be a small weapon (Rl 15:5, 9). Trooper McMann suspected the 
bulge "could have been a number of things," including "a small firearm, like a small 
revolver or something, by just the size[:] But then again I didn't know what it was, just 
that he kept putting his hands back in his pocket" (Rl 15:7). Trooper McMann 
emphasized that he didn't "want to be hurt[,]" and "just want[ed] to make sure 
[defendant] [didn't] have any weapons on him" (id.). Trooper McMann's concern about 
the bulge increased as defendant "became more nervous and kept putting his hands back 
in" his pockets (Rl 15:12). 
The trooper had also noticed a marijuana tattoo on defendant's right shoulder 
which reminded him that he had arrested defendant for marijuana five or six years earlier 
(Rl 15:7, 11, 13). Concerned about the bulge in defendant's pocket, and the fact that 
defendant had his hands in his pockets, the trooper asked defendant to remove them from 
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his pockets (Rl 15:15). He also asked defendant about the marijuana tattoo and told 
defendant that he remembered arresting him in 1994 or 1995 for marijuana (Rl 15:7, 11, 
13). Consequently, the trooper asked defendant whether he had "anything" on him, or in 
his car, and if was using drugs (Rl 15:7, 14). Defendant denied using drugs and said he 
did not want the trooper to search his car (id.). Trooper McMann observed that, 
"[defendant] started to get really nervous" (id.). 
Specifically, defendant put his hands back in his pockets, even though the trooper 
had just asked him to remove them (Rl 15:5-8). Defendant also "shift[ed] his weight 
from one foot to the other[,] [h]e continued to look back and forth[,] [n]ot really avoiding 
eye contact but not having a lot of eye contact with [the trooper]" (Rl 15:5). Based on 
his prior experience, Trooper McMann believed defendant "was looking for a way to 
walk around [him]"or to "escape" (Rl 15:5-6, 15-16), which defendant ultimately did: 
With the bulge and his continuing to look around as if looking for an 
escape route, his nervous appearance, kept putting his hands back in, I said 
that for my safety-you're making me nervous. For my safety I want to 
make sure you don't have any weapons on you. So I put my left hand in 
the small of his back. I know in the report I put push, but it wasn't 
forceful, just a guide to get him turned around so I could be behind him for 
a safe Terry frisk. At that immediate point that's when he took off running 
(Rl 15:6) (see also Rl 15:8 ("As soon as I put my hand on his back to turn him towards 
the car, that's when he took off running. I didn't get a chance to do anything"). 
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Trooper McCann apprehended defendant only "when he finally got to a fence that 
he [could] not climb over" (Rl 15:31-32).: As the trooper approached, defendant threw 
some items over the fence, which when retrieved, turned out to be a syringe and a 
homemade light bulb used to consume methamphetamine (id.). Both items were tested 
and found to contain methamphetamine (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling 
upholding the attempted protective frisk and shown that it is inadequate to support the 
ruling. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling must be rejected on this ground 
alone. 
Even overlooking the failure to marshal here, however, Trooper McCann's 
attempt to frisk defendant during the traffic stop was eminently reasonable, given the 
totality of the circumstances confronting the trooper. Defendant behaved in an unusually 
excitable manner from the outset of the encounter, and also falsely reported that his 
girlfriend had stolen a truck that turned out to be registered in her name. Against this 
backdrop, the trooper recalled, based on his observation of defendant's marijuana tattoo, 
that he personally had previously arrested defendant for marijuana. The trooper also 
observed a suspicious bulge in defendant's pocket which he feared may be a small 
2Events following defendant's flight were not adduced at the suppression hearing, 
but were summarized by the prosecutor pursuant to defendant's conditional guilty plea 
(R155:31-32). 
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weapon, and defendant refused to comply with the trooper's repeated requests to remove 
his hands from his pockets. Given these circumstances, and the fact that all traffic stops 
are recognized as inherently dangerous situations for law enforcement, the trial court 
properly ruled that the attempted frisk constituted a legitimate safety precaution. 
Defendant has not adequately briefed any possible challenge to the trooper's 
questioning regarding his current use and possession of drugs; in any event, the 
questioning was supported by articulable reasonable suspicion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TROOPER'S ATTEMPT TO FRISK DEFENDANT DURING 
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY A LEGITIMATE 
SAFETY CONCERN, UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING DEFENDANTS FALSE 
REPORT OF A STOLEN TRUCK, A SUSPICIOUS BULGE IN 
DEFENDANT'S POCKET, HIS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
TROOPER'S REPEATED REQUESTS TO REMOVE HIS HANDS 
FROM HIS POCKETS, AND THE INHERENT DANGER IN ANY 
TRAFFIC STOP SCENARIO 
The trial court found that during Trooper McMann's encounter with defendant, 
defendant "repeatedly put his hand in the pocket where this object or bulge was," even 
after Trooper McMann had "repeatedly told [him] to remove [it]" (Rl 15:25), add. B. 
Defendant's disobedient conduct thus "[gave] the officer a justification for being nervous 
or uneasy or concerned, because normally a person, once they've been told by the officer 
once or twice don't do that, understands that they're not supposed to do that, that that's a 
problem" (id.). The trial court further ruled that Trooper McMann had a "right to look 
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out for his own personal safety," "whether issuing a traffic ticket or a warning or 
anything else" (Rl 15:25-26), add. B. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling upholding the frisk, claiming that 
Trooper McCann's concern about the bulge in his pocket and his prior marijuana arrest 
did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was armed or dangerous. Aplt. Br. at 
3-5. Defendant's challenge fails to fully consider the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the trooper and otherwise lacks merit. 
Failure to Marshall. Indeed, defendant does not attempt to demonstrate clear 
error in the trial court's findings regarding the attempted protective frisk. Aplt. Br. at 3-
7. See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 475, 475 (Utah 1990) (holding that to show clear 
error appellant must marshal all evidence supporting trial court's findings and 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, is insufficient to 
support the findings). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). If, 
as here, the appellant makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's ruling and to demonstrate its insufficiency, the appellate court "accepts the trial 
court's findings as stated in its ruling." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, at ^[13, 983 P.2d 
556. See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991 (failure to 
marshal evidence). Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling must be rejected on 
this ground alone. 
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Even overlooking defendant's failure to marshal here however, the trial court 
properly upheld the attempted protective frisk. 
The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness. The touchstone of [an] 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1,19 (1968)). In other words, "[t]he Fourth Amendment is no t . . . a guarantee against 
all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 (1985). 
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention as occurred 
here, a dual inquiry applies. Id. The first question is "whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception," and the second is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the inference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20). See also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). As 
defendant does not assert that the instant traffic stop was unjustified, the issue here is 
whether Trooper McMann unreasonably extended the traffic stop when he attempted to 
frisk defendant. 
[It is well established that a "detention incident to a traffic stop 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). 
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Additionally, the length and scope of the stop must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible[,]" id. (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20)). However, "a valid investigatory stop may include 'a request for 
identification and inquiry concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained/' 
Lopez, 863 P.2d at 1133 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 
(1981)). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1995) ("A peace officer may stop any 
person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.")- This means that during a 
routine traffic stop, police 
may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, che must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 
1990)). In a routine traffic stop, "investigative questioning that further detains the driver 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/' Id. 
A reviewing court's after-the-fact assessment of any articulated reasonable 
suspicion must take into account the "totality of the circumstances present at the time of 
the stop to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity/' 
State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 
10 
937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997)). As recently emphasized by the United States 
Supreme Court, totality of circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" 
United States v. Arvizu, U.S. , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750-751 (2002) (quoting United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
Moreover, given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, police are entitled to take 
reasonable precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic 
investigation. State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1J 10, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. 
at 110-111); State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). See also United 
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) {en banc). Indeed, "[o]wing to 
inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the intrusion, officers may order the 
occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation." 
James, 2000 UT 80, Tf 10 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111).3 As further recognized 
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[i]t is clear that the safety concerns guiding the Supreme 
Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any particular showing that an officer was 
3Recognizing the inherent danger in all traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that police may ask the occupants of a vehicle if they possess 
loaded weapons, even in the absence of particularized suspicion that the occupants are 
armed and dangerous. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225. 
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at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances of a given automobile stop, . . . but 
rather are of an inherent and general nature." James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 10 (citation omitted). 
This Case. Notwithstanding the inherent danger, the usual motorist stopped for 
traffic violations is not ordinarily subjected to an attempted protective frisk. Defendant, 
however, was not the usual motorist. Immediately after being stopped, and without being 
asked to do so, defendant left his vehicle and ran toward the trooper in an upset and 
excited manner. Defendant then proceeded to falsely inform the trooper that his 
girlfriend had just stolen his truck. Defendant's excitement escalated when the trooper 
informed him that the truck was not registered in his name, but in the name of the 
purported thief, defendant's girlfriend. Defendant did not calm down, even when the 
trooper stated that he would only give him a warning for the stop sign violation. See 
Statement of the Facts, supra. 
Additionally, in the course of his interaction with defendant, Trooper McCann 
observed a marijuana tattoo on defendant's shoulder, and recalled that he had previously 
arrested defendant for marijuana in 1994 or 1995. The trooper also observed a large 
bulge in defendant's right pants pocket, beneath a pack of Camel cigarettes which was 
protruding from the pocket. The bulge raised a safety concern for Trooper McCann and 
he asked defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. Defendant initially complied, 
but then inserted his hands into his pockets over the trooper's repeated requests to 
remove them. Defendant did not cease this behavior, even though the trooper told him it 
12 
was causing him to be concerned for his personal safety. Defendant's agitation increased 
as the trooper questioned him about his prior arrest-defendant would not make direct eye 
contact with Trooper McCann and shifted his weight from foot to foot. Trooper McCann 
correctly anticipated that defendant was looking for an opportunity to flee, which 
defendant did, when the trooper attempted to frisk him. See Statement of the Facts, 
supra. 
Trooper McCann's safety concern was both real and reasonable. As noted 
previously, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court recognize 
the inherent danger facing police during traffic stops. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that c[i]n 1994 alone, there were 5,672 
officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." The Supreme 
Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an 
officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) 
(FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were 
killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFAve, Search and Seizure, § 
9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (1996) (more officers are shot while conducting field interrogations 
than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer shootings occurred pursuant to 
a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has been made). As tragically 
highlighted by recent events in this state, Utah is not immune from the national trend. 
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See Angie Welling, Officer's death shocks Lehi, Deseret News, August 5, 2001, at Al (a 
copy is attached). See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffil 2-5, 994 P.2d 177 
(passenger in traffic stop shoots at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his 
hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (dnver shot at officer 
without warning as officer approached vehicle). Thus, given the totality of the 
circumstances here, Trooper McCann reasonably attempted to frisk defendant. 
Defendant's attempts to analogize the instant frisk to those invalidated in State v. 
Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), and 
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), are not persuasive. See Aplt. Br. at 5. 
For example, Carter involved an investigation of drug smuggling at the airport. Id. at 
466. This Court upheld the trial court's finding that "the officer's perception of a line 
just at or above the defendant's waist, but under his outer clothing, did not give rise to 
reasonable articulable suspicion" Carter was smuggling. Id. The Court observed that the 
officer testified that it was his experience that drugs are often smuggled by taping them 
to one's mid-section; however, the officer also testified that he "definitely didn't know 
exactly what [the line] was," and it could just as likely have been ''shorts or something 
else." Id. at 466 n. 6. Thus, giving appropriate deference to the trial court's ability to 
determine that the "officer's preliminary suspicions were still more in the nature of a 
hunch and had not risen to the requisite level of reasonable suspicion," and noting the 
State did not challenge the finding, this Court declined to find any error therein. Id. 
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Carter is thus not helpful here because it involves neither a traffic stop scenario with its 
inherent dangers, nor a bulge reasonably suspected to be a small gun, as here. Indeed, 
there is no indication that the officer in Carter ever suspected the "line" at Carter's waist 
was anything other than drugs or clothing. 
White is similarly unavailing as police observed no bulge in White's clothing, 
merely that he was wearing a winter coat. Id. at 661. On appeal, this Court held that 
"while the appearance of a suspicious bulge in the outer clothing of a suspect may be a 
factor in indicating that the suspect might be armed, [] simply wearing a winter coat is 
not." Id. (citation omitted). White thus, if anything, inferentially supports the State's 
position here. Carter and White are therefore distinguishable from the circumstance in 
which Trooper McCann found himself. 
A more analogous case than either Carter or White, is State v. Rochelle, 850 P.2d 
480, 483 (Utah App. 1993), where this Court upheld a protective frisk dunng traffic stop 
based on the officer's observation of a similar "bulge" in Rochelle's pocket. See also 
Stout v. State, 804 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ark. 1991) (upholding protective frisk performed 
to determine if "obvious bulge" in suspect's jacket was a weapon); United States v. 
Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1067 n.10 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding protective frisk where 
officer observed "heavy object" protruding from suspect's jacket pocket); 4 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a) n.55-56 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (collecting cases and 
observing that cases involving a "characteristic bulge in the suspect's clothing," or 
15 
'"observation of an object in the pocket which might be weapon," are "[illustrative of the 
circumstances which the courts have deemed sufficient" for a protective fnsk). As 
further observed by this Court, "roadside traffic stops are particularly dangerous when 
weapons may be present in the area immediately surrounding a suspect." State v. 
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted). Trooper McCann 
therefore reasonably attempted to frisk defendant and the trial court's ruling can be 
upheld this ground. 
In sum, given the totality of the circumstances here, particularly the suspicious 
bulge in defendant's pocket and his repeated failure to comply with the trooper's requests 
to remove his hands therefrom, Trooper McMann reasonably attempted to frisk 
defendant during the traffic stop. As correctly observed by the trial court, Trooper 
McMann had a "right to look out for his own personal safety," "whether issuing a traffic 
ticket or a warning or anything else" (Rl 15:25-26), add. B. The trial court's sound 
ruling should be upheld. 
* * * 
Failure to Comply With Briefing Rule. Defendant also challenged the propnety 
of the trooper's drug-related questioning below, but does not specifically press this issue 
in his appellate brief. See Aplt. Br. at 3-7. Indeed, defendant's broad challenge to the 
scope of the traffic stop does not mention the questioning, let alone analyze it in any 
meaningful manner. Id. He has therefore abandoned this argument on appeal. 
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Moreover, Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an 
appellant's argument to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined to address 
inadequately brief issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. 
App. 1981)); see also Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). 
Reasonable Suspicion to Further Detain. Even if the Court were to overlook 
defendant's appellate waiver and inadequate briefing, the totality of the circumstances 
confronting Trooper McCann reasonably gave rise to suspicion defendant might have 
been using drugs, or had them on his person or in his vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 
108-09 (recognizing that the "touchstone"of Fourth Amendment law is 
"reasonableness") (quoting Terry, 392,U.S. at 19)); Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 
(recognizing reasonable suspicion is "somewhat abstract" concept and rejecting as sharp 
departure from precedent circuit court's practice of evaluating in isolation from each 
other factors contributing to reasonable suspicion). 
Indeed, defendant behaved in an unusually excited and nervous manner from the 
outset of the traffic stop when, without being asked to do so, he immediately exited his 
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vehicle, ran toward the trooper, and falsely reported his truck had been stolen. 
Defendant's agitation increased when the trooper informed him that the truck was in fact 
registered in his (defendant's) girlfriend's name, and he did not calm down when the 
trooper informed him he would only be warned for the stop sign violation. Moreover, 
the trooper noticed a suspicious bulge in defendant's pants pocket and defendant failed 
to comply with trooper's repeated requests that he remove his hands from his pockets, 
even when informed that his behavior was causing the trooper to fear for his safety. 
Defendant would not make direct eye-contact with the trooper and shifted his and weight 
from foot to foot, and otherwise behaved as if he was about to flee, which he ultimately 
did. Finally, the marijuana tattoo on defendant's shoulder triggered the trooper's 
memory that he personally had arrested defendant for marijuana approximately five or 
six years earlier. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Defendant's cursory assertion that his prior marijuana arrest should not be 
considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus is simply mistaken. Humphrey, 937 
P.2d at 143 (recognizing that information regarding an individual's prior criminal 
activity is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion). Further, while no one of the 
above factors is alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion defendant was using or 
in possession of drugs, viewed as a totality, they justify the trooper's drug-related 
inquiries here. Id. (recognizing that while "past criminal activity, nervousness, anger, 
and traveling back from a known drug community'did not individually support 
reasonable suspicion, they did in combination). See also State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 0_ February 2002,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two 
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following: 
DALEM. DORIUS 
JUSTIN C.BOND 
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6, m 11, 994 P.2d 1278 (recognizing that defendant's "extreme nervousness" properly 
lead the officer to believe that he was involved in "more serious criminal activity"), 
Laime v. State\ 60 S.W.3d 464, 474 (Ark. 2001) (holding reasonable suspicion of drug 
trafficking legitimately entertained based in part on defendant's misrepresentation 
regarding a prior drug conviction and his "ever-increasing agitation"). The trial court's 
ruling should thus be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm both the trial court's ruling denying the motion to 
suppress and defendant's third degree felony conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 5~~February 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
&ARIAN DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
RICHARD M. GALLEGOS - #8189 
Box Elder County Public Defender 
3856 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden. Utah 84403 
Telephone (801) 334-7424 
Facsimile (801)627-1120 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
ADAM NISH, * 
Case No. 001100423 
Defendant * Judge: BEN HADFIELD 
COMES NOW, Defendant, Adam Nish, by and through his attorney of record, 
Richard M. Gallegos, and hereby moves this Court to Suppress, based upon the following 
reasons: 
1 Trooper John McMahon exceeded the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully request the improperly obtained evidence be 
Suppressed. An accompanying Memorandum will be filed no later than October 25, 2000. 
DATED this2l) day of October, 2000. 
RICHARDS! GALLEGOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Suppress, first class, postage prepaid, on this Jf day of October, 2000, to the following 
Jon J Bunderson 
Box Elder County Attorney 
45 North 100 East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Secretary 
Dale M. Dorius #0903 
Justin C. Bond #8047 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-5219 Phone 
(801) 723-5210 Fax 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
ADAM NISH 
Plaintiff ] 
Defendant ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
> Case No 001100423 
1 Judge: Ben H Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, and hereby submits the following 
memorandum in support of Defendant's Motion to Support. 
FACTS 
1 On July 10, 2000 at 9 40 am the officer was westbound on SR 102 in Tremonton He 
observed a vehicle coming from the North and noticed the vehicle failed to yield at a stop sign. 
The officer further noticed the driver was not wearing a seat belt The officer affected a traffic 
stop ^ pM* - -UJ 
1 
j£x 25 iOoj i i ro i 
2. Defendant exited the vehicle and approached the officer Defendant was upset and 
excited. He stated his truck had been stolen by his girlfriend The officer states that Defendant 
was excited and angry but was cooperative 
3 The officer inquired about the stolen vehicle and learned Defendant's girlfriend's name 
was on the registration of the truck. The officer told Defendant it could not be stolen since her 
name was on the registration. 0 k<e*~* +*~ i/fs*T- flff~* *««-#***, U.k:^*** ^ 
4. At this point the officer states he noticed a prominent bulge in Defendant's right front 
pocket. The officer further states he could see a ifack of camel cigarettes at the top of the pocket 
but there was something larger underneath. )([ J L L/* ^ pdU ,*f*U(, a*U L ^ ' ^ 
5. Defendant stated he needed to go find his girlfriend before she left for Ogden. The 
officer stated he would give Defendant a warning for the stop sign. ^ 
6. At this point, the officer states he noticed a tattoo on Defendant's shoulder The 
Officer also remembered arresting Defendant for a drug charge in 1994 or 1995. The officer then 
asked Defendant if he still used drugs. Defendant stated no. 
7. The officer then asked if he could search Defendant's car. Defendant stated no, "I 
don t want you looking in my car. 4 , 
8. The officer then states he became concerned for his safety due to the Defendant putting 
his hands in his pockets where the officer had earlier noticed the bulge. The officer then put his 
hand on the small of Defendant's back to push him toward the police car so terry frisk could be 
performed.. Defendant fled from the officer. Defendant was caught shortly after. 
9 Several items of an alleged controlled substance were found. 
2 
MEMORANDUM 
Defendant contends the officer exceeded the scope of the stop in the present action. 
Defendant further argues the officer did not have probable cause to request a terry frisk on 
Defendant. 
It is well settled that once an officer effectuates a traffic stop, the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 
In State v. Chevre. 994 P.2d 1278, (Utah App. 2000) the Utah Appellate Court held 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" > Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1132 (quoting > Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319, 
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). If there is investigative questioning that detains the 
driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it "must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion 
based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances 
facing the officer at the time of the stop." > Id. If the officer reasonably suspects 
more serious criminal activity, "the scope of the stop is still limited." > Id. The 
officer must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm 
or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to 
detain the defendant." > State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
994 P 2d 1278, State v. Chevre, (Utah App. 2000) 
Excerpt from pages 994 P 2d 1280-994 P.2d 1281 
In the present action, the key to determining whether reasonable suspicion existed based 
on the officer's statement about the bulge in Defendant's pocket and the officer's fear for his 
safety, and the officer's claim he had arrested the Defendant back in 1994 or 1995 for a drug 
violation, is by a close reading of relevant case law regarding each of the three statements by the 
officer justifying the search. 
First, regarding the bulge in Defendant's pocket, the Utah Appellate Court in State v. 
3 
Carter. 707 P.2d 656, (Utah 1985) held 
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth 
Amendment requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a 
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and 
reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer 
may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover weapons 
that might be used against him. "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was 
in danger." > 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. See also > Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L Ed.2d 612 (1972), > Sibron v. New York, 392 
U S. 40, > 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); > State v. Cole, Utah, 674 P.2d 
119 (1983); > State v. Rocha, Utah, 600 P.2d 543 (1979); > State v. Lopes, 
Utah, 552 P.2d 120 (1976). 
> [2]> [3]> [4] The reasonableness of a frisk for weapons is judged by an 
objective standard. > 1 It is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear. 
See > United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976). Since no one 
factor is determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine the 
reasonableness of a frisk in light of all the facts. See > State v. Houser, Utah, 669 
P.2d 437, 439 (1983). There must, however, be some reasonable basis for both 
stopping and frisking; the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." > 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. A mere 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient. 
707 P 2d 656, State v. Carter, (Utah 1985) 
Excerpt from page 707 P.2d 659 
In the present action, a mere bulge in Defendant's pocket does not rise to the level of a 
reasonable belief the Defendant was armed or dangerous. The bulge in Defendant's pocket could 
have been anything. There is nothing in the officer's police report detailing what the bulge may 
have appeared to be to the officer. As the Court stated in State v. Rochellr 850 P 2d 480 (Utah 
App. 1993) 
The officer must justify a pat down search by "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
4 
that intrusion." > Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 
850 P.2d 480, State v. Rochell, (Utah App. 1993) 
Excerpt from page 850 P.2d 483 
Merely stating there is a bulge in a suspects pockets is not a specific and articulable fact. 
In RochelL the Trial Court made the following findings 
The court made the following findings regarding the objective facts relied 
upon by Maycock to frisk Rochell: That Rochell had been speeding, he had been 
drinking and driving, his companion had also been drinking, Rochell had been 
driving with an open container of alcohol in the front seat of the car, Rochell had 
been speeding, that upon being stopped, Rochell left his vehicle and walked toward 
the officer, Rochell had a bulge in his pocket, the officer believed the bulge could 
have been a weapon.\> 2 and, when asked whether he had any weapons, Rochell 
"was hesitant in answering no," 
850 P.2d 480, State v. Rochell, (Utah App. 1993) 
Excerpt from page 850 P.2d 483 
Again, in the present action, there are no specific and articulable facts about the bulge. 
In State v, Sykes. 840 P.2d 825,(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State vT Carter) the Utah 
Appellate Court held 
In > State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, > 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), narcotics officers observed defendant deplaning from 
a flight arriving from Los Angeles, acting in a manner thought to be indicative of a 
drug carrier. The officers stopped defendant, identified themselves, and asked to 
examine his bag and to conduct a pat-down search of defendant's person. This 
court held that the encounter became a level two seizure at this point, if not 
sooner, and agreed with the trial court's findings that there was no reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court noted that the bulge under 
defendant's clothing at waist level and his failure to produce identification were 
inadequate circumstances for the officers to have formed a reasonable articulable 
suspicion. > Id. at 466-67. 
840 P.2d 825, State v. Sykes, (Utah App. 1992) 
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Excerpt from page 840 P 2d 828 
Finally, Utah Courts have noted that the nature of the crime is relevant in determining 
whether a terry frisk is justified. In State v. White. 856 P 2d 656 (Utah App 1993) the Utah 
Appellate Court stated 
Utah courts have also noted the significance of the nature of the suspected 
crime on the right to conduct an immediate frisk of a suspect. See > State v 
Carter, 707 P 2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); > State v Strickling, 844 P 2d 979, 984 
(Utah App 1992) Specifically, the > Carter court authorized the automatic frisk 
of a burglary suspect because the officer could reasonably believe that a burglar 
might carry dangerous tools or weapons in anticipation of strenuous objection 
from an intended victim. > Carter, 707 P 2d at 660. 
>FN9 Certain Supreme Court justices, state judges, and commentary have 
questioned, however, whether suspicion of less violent criminal activity should 
justify an immediate frisk in the absence of circumstantial evidence supporting the 
possibility that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous. > Sibron, 392 U S at 
73-74, 88 S Ct at 1907 (Harlan, J concurring). See also > State v Chapman, 841 
P 2d 725, 730-32 (Utah App. 1992) (Orme, J. dissenting) (arguing that the 
violation of a loitering ordinance created an insufficient suspicion of danger to 
automatically justify a frisk). However, State v Hubbard, No. 910718-CA, slip 
op at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 27, 1993), noted that "the nature of the intrusions may 
differ when a stop to investigate past criminal behavior is involved," because a stop 
based on a past crime does not necessarily have the same governmental interests as 
one pertaining to a potential immediate crime. 
> FN 10 While the > Greene court decided that police officers could respond 
immediately to a domestic violence call by entering the dwelling where a domestic 
incident was allegedly occurring, it did not discuss whether an alleged suspect 
could automatically be frisked. > Id. Approving the immediate response of 
entering the site of an alleged domestic incident does not constitute authority to 
conduct automatically a frisk in the absence of any indication that the domestic 
incident was ongoing or any evidence that the parties present were those involved 
in the alleged dispute. 
> FN11 LaFave suggested that, with the exception of drug dealing, suspicion of 
drug related offenses should only require a frisk when other circumstances 
indicative of arms possession or danger are present See LaFave, § 9 4(a) at 507 
6 
(discussing possession of small amounts of marijuana or liquor, and trafficking in 
small amounts of narcotics as circumstances authorizing frisk only in presence of 
other relevant circumstances). 
856 P.2d 656, State v. White, (Utah App. 1993) 
Excerpt from page 856 P.2d 666_ 
In the present action, Defendant was stopped for a mere traffic violation. No other 
indication of criminal behavior was present. 
Second, regarding Defendant's past criminal history, the Utah Appellate Court in State v. 
Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137(Utah App. 1997) held 
Nervous behavior in the presence of police officers, alone, is also not enough. See 
> Potter, 860 P.2d at 957; > State v. Lovegren, 829 P 2d 155, 158 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). In addition, the fact an individual previously has been involved in 
criminal activity is also not enough. We recognize that consideration of an 
individual's past criminal history is not properly part of the probable cause 
determination See > State v. Brooks. 849 P 2d 640. 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(stating information that defendant had been target of past drug investigations not 
considered in determining probable cause of current possession of controlled 
substances). 
937 P.2d 137, State v. Humphrey, (Utah App. 1997) 
Excerpt from page 937 P.2d 143 
The officers statement that he had arrested Defendant previously, almost five or six years 
previously, should not be used a determination of suspicion as stated in Humphrey. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the suppress the evidence in the above action. 
> 
DATED this 7^ day of January, 2001. ^ 
JUSTIN C BOND 
Attorney at Law 
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Addendum B 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. . ) Case No. 001100423 
) Transcript of Videotape 
ADAM G. NISH, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Transcript of Motion to Suppress and Arraignment. 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Brigham City, Utah 
January 25, 2001 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: ROGER F. BARON 
Deputy County Attorney 
For the Defendant: JUSTIN C. BOND 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court L C M CZP\ 
P. 0. Box 373 - . . . n L t U 
Brigham City, UT 34302-0373 Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT u. 2001 
I- Pautette Stagg 
ORIGINAL ~ °"—*«• 
<3Q0/Q19&CA 
THE CLERK: Case numcer 001100423, State cf ::an 
versus Adam Nish. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I apologize for the delay. I 
was in a meeting this morning and when I got out it was 11 
and the clerk advised me that Mr. Bond had filed this 
memorandum at about ten. I wanted to at least skim through 
it before we started the hearing. As a result of that I left 
the file sitting on my desk. The clerk will have it back in 
here in a moment. 
MR. BARON: The actual motion was filed long ago by 
Mr. Gallegos. He was going to file a memorandum. I never 
saw it. I mentioned that to Mr. Bond and asked if he would 
file something so I had more of an idea what they were 
claiming. I appreciate him filing that. 
I don't know that it will be necessary to file a 
responsive memorandum. I would just ask at the end of the 
hearing, if the court desires me to do so, I would be happy 
to do that, but I doubt it will be necessary. 
THE COURT: Okay. As to the facts, Mr. Baron, 
you've gone through Mr. Bond's recitation of the facts. Are 
there some of those that are in dispute? 
MR. BARON: They're just net complete. I do have 
the officer here. I think we can -- I think what the 
essential issue is going to be is whether there were specific 
and articulable facts justifying the frisk. I think we can 
do that in a few minutes, put on that much of the testimony. 
THE COURT: Ail right. Go ahead and call your 
witness. 
MR. BARON: Call John McMann. 
JOHN MCMANN, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARON: 
Q. Tell us your name, please. 
A. John McMann. 
Q. And you're a trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol, is 
that correct? 
A. I am. 
Q. Today we're talking about something that occurred back m 
July, July 10th, about 9:40 in the morning." You were out in 
the Tremonton area and I'm going to lead you through the 
unimportant business here. As you were patrolling you saw a 
vehicle that failed to yield to a stop sign. You also 
noticed that the vehicle had no license plate, so you made a 
traffic stop of the vehicle. Do you recall that occurring? 
A. I do. It didn't have a plate on the front. 
Q. Okay. Didn't have a plate on the front. Immediately 
after the traffic stop the defendant, Mr. Nish, gets out ana 
heads back to your vehicle. He appears to be upset and 
excited, is that correct? 
A. He was. When he got out of the vehicle he approached me 
rather quickly. 
Q. And he appeared to be upset and excited at that point? 
A. He was. 
Q. And let's get more detail at this point. I understand he 
wanted to report to you a vehicle being stolen? 
A. Yeah. He ran back to my car. He appeared to be very 
upset. He stated that his girlfriend had just stolen his 
truck. I asked him to step back and over towards the 
sidewalk. I advised him why I had stopped him. I asked him 
what had just occurred. He said he had had an argument with 
his girlfriend and she got into his truck and took off. At 
the point where he was failing to stop at the stop sign, 
that's where he was coming up to Main to try and see which 
way she had gone. She had turned eastbound. 
I got the information on the truck, contacted dispatch 
and advised them to put out an attempt to locate on the 
vehicle for possibly being stolen. A short time later they 
advised me that the truck was actually registered to his 
girlfriend's name. 
Q. When you informed Mr. Nish of that what was his response? 
A. He had calmed down a little bit at that point. I told 
him that due to the fact she was the registered owner he 
couldn't report it stolen. That made him more upset. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. While standing by the rear of the vehicle I explained ::• 
him I understand your situation. You had an argument with 
your girlfriend. I'll give you a warning for the stop sign 
violation. 
While standing there talking to him he still appeared 
upset. He appeared outwardly nervous, shifting his weight 
from one foot to the other. He continued to look back and 
forth. Not really avoiding eye contact but not having a lot 
of eye contact with me. From my experience it appeared like 
he was looking for a way to walk around me or a way to leave. 
Q. Did you notice anything as far as -- you mention in your 
report his pockets? 
A. Yes. While standing there talking to him he had his 
hands in his pockets. I just asked him -- because he was 
upset, appeared to be nervous to me. This is after I asked 
him about the tattoo and the previous drug arrest I had with 
him years ago, and if he had anything in his vehicle. While 
standing there he had a Camel cigarette pack sticking out of 
his right pants pocket. I could see the top of it. 
Underneath that was a large bulge. He kept putting his hands 
in his pockets. I asked him to take his hands cut. He 
continued to appear nervous and looking back and forth. He 
put his hands back in his pockets. Again I asked him to keep 
his hands out of his pockets for my safety. 
Q. You indicate that at the time ne was putting his nanas ::. 
his pockets and taking them out, was he upset at that point? 
A. He was. 
Q. Okay. Was he upset at you or the system or what was he 
upset over? 
A. I think at the situation with his girlfriend, is the best 
I could tell. And the fact that I was asking him questions 
in reference to a previous drug arrest and if he had anything 
on him or in his vehicle. 
Q. So a combination of he's upset with his girlfriend, he 
doesn't like the questions you're asking. Was he upset 
because you weren't going to go pick up the vehicle? 
A. Initially I believe that's why he was upset. 
Q. And then what happens, after you told him a couple of 
times to take his hands out of his pockets? 
A. With the bulge and his continuing to look around as if 
looking for an escape route, his nervous appearance, kept 
putting his hands back in, I said that for my safety --
you're making me nervous. For my safety I want to make sure 
you don't have any weapons on you. So I put my left hand m 
the small of his back. I know in the report I put push, but 
it wasn't forceful, just a guide to get him turned arcuna s: 
I could be behind him for a safe Terry frisk. At that 
immediate point that's when he took off running. 
Q. He took off running? 
A. Took off running to my right and eastbound on Mam 
Street. 
Q. Let's talk more about this bulge in his pocket. Are 
there any weapons that you know of that would have been the 
size of that bulge that you saw in his pocket? 
A. The size could have been a number of things, but it could 
have been a small firearm, like a small revolver or 
something, by just the size. But then again I didn't know 
what it was, just that he kept putting his hands back in his 
pocket. 
Q. It certainly could have been a weapon that he could have 
used against you? 
A. That's what I initially thought, you know, because of his 
nervousness. For my safety that's what I'm thinking is 
weapon. I don't want to be hurt. I just want to make sure 
he doesn't have any weapons on him. 
Q. During what period of the conversation was he looking 
around like he's looking for a way to get out of the 
situation or to leave? 
A. When I started asking him about the tattoo on his arm. I 
said I think I remember arresting you in 1994 or '95 for 
marijuana, something like that. Do you have anything on you 
now, do you use drugs now. At that point that's when he 
started to get real nervous. 
Q. Okay. And then later, after he runs, you find some drugs 
and obviously we know at this point wny he was nervous? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But at that point you didn't know the reason, but you 
felt nervous enough yourself, uncertain enough, that you felt 
a Terry frisk was in order? 
A. Yes, because of his outwardly nervous indications, kept 
putting his hands back in his pocket. For my safety, to make 
sure I didn't get hurt, that's why I wanted to perform the 
Terry frisk. 
Q. When he first put his hands in his pockets and you asked 
him to take them out, did you say please don't put your hands 
in your pockets so he knew he wasn't supposed to continue to 
do that? 
A. Yeah. What I usually say is just keep your hands out of 
your pockets, for me. 
Q. So keep your hands out of your pockets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time he kept putting them in? 
A. After a short period, yes, he put his hands back in his 
pockets. I said keep your hands out of your pockets. 
Q. Okay. You didn't really get a chance to do any kind of 
frisk on him at all? 
A. No. As soon as I put my hand on his back to turn him1 
towards the car, that's when he took off running. I didn't 
get a chance to do anything. 
MR. BARON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOND: 
Q. Let's see. How long was it between the initial time yc\ 
pulled him over and the time you started to do the Terry 
frisk? 
A. Without having a log, I would just guesstimate 
probably -- talking to dispatch, probably between five, ten 
minutes. 
Q. Somewhere between five and ten minutes. Now, when you 
first saw the defendant walk up to your car did you notice 
this bulge in his pocket? 
A. I wasn't really looking at it at that time. I was more 
looking at his face and hands as he was walking back to me. 
Q. So at what point did you first notice the bulge? 
A. When I'm standing there with him by the back of the car 
talking to him about the stolen vehicle. 
Q. And there are things that happened after that, correct? 
I mean, there were things that happened after that but pno: 
to the Terry frisk, right? 
A. In reference to what? 
Q. Well, you saw the bulge in his pocket and then some oth~ 
things transpired and then you did the Terry frisk, isn't 
that right? 
A. Things transpired as rar as my observations or what was 
said? \ 
Q. Conversations with him and things like that. 
A. Well, noticing the bulge was more when he kept putting 
his hands back in his pocket. When I started talking to him 
after he started to appear more upset and nervous. More 
upset that he couldn't report it stolen and nervous as far as 
the questions I was asking. 
Q. But when you saw the bulge in his pocket you didn't 
immediately do the Terry frisk at that point, did you? 
A. No. That's when I continued to tell him to keep his 
hands out of his pocket. 
Q. You have in your police report "at this point I noticed a 
prominent bulge in Nish's right front pants pocket." And 
then you indicate that he made some statements, right? 
A. Where are you reading? 
Q. Just before -- the bottom of the fourth paragraph. 
MR. BARON: At the bottom or the top of the fourth 
paragraph? 
MR. BOND: The bottom. "Jot number four, it's the 
fourth actual paragraph. It's actually paragraph three. 
Q. (BY MR. BOND) Do you see that? 
A. The bottom of number three? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I was looking at number four. (Pause.) Yeah, that's 
when I noticed tne prominent bulge, tne cigarette pack 
sticking out the top. 
Q. So you noticed a prominent bulge in his front pants 
pocket, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then he made a statement that he needed to go find 
his girlfriend, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then you said that you were just going to give him a 
warning for the stop sign and let him go, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then you asked him if -- you told him that you 
remembered arresting him in '94, '95, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then you pointed to the marijuana tattoo on his right 
shoulder, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then he started to put his hands back in his pockets 
and things like that? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So how much time is there between the time you first 
noticed the bulge in his pocket and when you actually tried 
to perform the Terry search? 
A. Probably 30 seconds to a minute. 
Q. All right. And when you initially saw this bulge, that 
didn't raise your suspicious aoout any weapons, isn't that 
true? 
A. When I initially saw the bulge? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. No. When he became more nervous and kept putting his 
hands back in is when it made it more of a concern to me. 
Q. So it was the bulge and putting his hand in. Did he t: 
to pull something out of his pocket? 
A. No. Just putting his hand in there. 
Q. So just putting his hands in his pockets is all he was 
doing? 
A. I don't know what his intentions were. 
Q. Now, tell me about the warning. Were you just going tc 
write him a warning or did you just tell him this is a 
warning, you can go now? 
A. I was going to write a warning. 
Q. You were going to write him a ticket? 
A. No. A warning. 
Q. I mean a warning ticket. You were actually going to 
write it down? 
A. Correct. 
So --
But we have our actual warning form. It's not a 
And you hadn't written that out yet? 
I believe I may have. 
Q. Did he have it? 
A. No. 
Q. So it was still in your book? 
A. Probably. I don't remember that part. 
Q. So the real reason -- okay. What you can remember is 
important. Can you remember if you gave him the warning 
ticket or not? 
A. I was probably holding onto it with his license and 
registration. 
Q. So the real reason you didn't give that back to him is 
because suddenly you remembered that you arrested him for a 
drug charge and you wanted to inquire about whether or not he 
still uses drugs, is that right? 
A. That's the reason I didn't give it to him? 
Q. Yeah. Why didn't you give him the warning ticket and let 
him go right then? 
A. I just wanted to talk to him about those -- the previous 
arrest. At this time — this is all happening 
simultaneously. He continues to appear more nervous to me. 
Q. But you're not concerned for your safety here? You're 
asking about drugs, right? 
A. At that point yeah, I asked him about the tattoo. 
Q. So at the point --
A. At that point I had remembered arresting him or giving 
him a ticket in '94, '95. 
Q. So it wasn't until you started to ask about tne drug 
charges and pointing to the mari]uana tattoo on his shoulder 
that he began to get nervous and then you got concerned, 
correct? 
A. Yes. Not as much upset about the girlfriend taking the 
truck, but more nervous about the questions I was asking. 
Q. All right. And then the reason you didn't give him the 
warning and the registration and his license back is that you 
wanted to ask him about whether he still used drugs, right? 
A. No. Ifve handed those back to people before and then 
asked them questions. I couldn't tell you what I was 
thinking at that exact point. 
Q. All right. 
A. Sometimes I hold onto it while I'm asking them and 
sometimes I hand it back. 
Q. In fact, you asked him that question if he still used 
drugs and he said no, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then you asked him if you could search his car, 
right? 
A. I asked him if he had anything in his car. 
Q. Quoting from your police report, "I asked him if he had 
any opposition to me looking in his vehicle"? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And he said no, I don't want you looking in my vehicle? 
A. C o r r e c t . 
Q. And then right after that you say -- then you say "at 
this point I was concerned for my safety due to the prominent 
bulge in his front pocket, that it may be a weapon," correct? 
A. That and he kept putting his hands back in his pockets at 
that point. 
MR. BOND: All right. That's all I have. 
MR. BARON: Just a couple of follow up. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARON: 
Q. Officer, as Mr. Bond was questioning you he skipped a few 
sentences there. He's got the defendant saying no, I don't 
want you looking in my car. He added that he didn't have 
anything on him. He then put his hands back into his 
pockets. So it was immediately after that that he's sticking 
his hands back in his pockets. Then ycu say "I again tola 
him to keep his hands out of his pockets." Is that the order 
that it occurred? 
A. Correct. When I first started to ask him to put his 
hands -- told him to keep his hands out and then asked him 
those questions, that's when he put them back in. 
Q. And then you told him to remove his hand one more time 
and he was looking around quickly.. Is this what you've 
described as him looking for a way out or a way to run? 
A. From my experience when I've had other foot pursuits, 
when people start looking around that indicates to me that 
they're looking for a way to get around. 
Q. But the delay between the time when you tell him you're 
going to give him the warning ticket to the time when he's 
running is just a matter of seconds or a minute or two? Just 
a very short time? 
A. A short time. It's all happening simultaneously. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I know it seems longer in the report, but while I'm 
saying, after noticing the tattoo, I think I arrested you in 
'94 or '95, do you have anything on you now, do you use drugs 
now, that only takes a few seconds to ask those questions. 
Q. And you put your hand on him and then he's gone? 
A. Correct. 
MR. BARON: That's all. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOND: 
Q. The earlier time when he got out of his car and came 
towards you, did you notice if he had his hands in his 
pockets? 
A. No. He had them out when he initially walked back to me. 
I remember watching his hands and face. He was upset. My 
girlfriend just stole my truck. He had his hands out of his 
pockets to get his license for me because he'd run the stop 
sign. 
Q. What aoout the five cr ten minutes where you were cal^~: 
dispatch and waiting for backup and all that stuff, did he 
cut his hands in his pockets? 
A. He was standing by his car. I was back behind my car 
door on the passenger side. I don't recall if he had his 
hands in his pockets. 
Q. So you weren't even watching him then? 
A. I was watching him, writing the warning and talking to 
dispatch. The initial contact was in reference to a stolen 
vehicle, so I didn't fear any threat to my safety. 
Q. So it wasn't until way down, when you started to talk 
about the drugs, that's when you started to fear for your 
safety? 
A. When he appeared very nervous and kept putting his hand; 
back that's when my safety was a concern. 
MR. BOND: All right. That's all. 
MR. BARON: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. BARON: We have no further witnesses. We rest, 
THE COURT: Mr. Bond, anything further? 
MR. BOND: No. Are we arguing it? I don't have a: 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask if you want to argue 
it now or if you want to submit a memorandum? How do you 
propose to proceed? 
MR. BARON: I would just suggest that: we do a quick 
argument and have it over with today. I think the state has 
shown specific and articulable facts which reasonably support 
the actions of the officer, plus you have the fact that he 
never did a frisk. We never got to the point where there was 
a frisk done. I'm not sure how we can suppress any evidence 
that resulted from an illegal frisk. We got to the point 
where a frisk was going to be done, but the defendant chose 
to leave at that point. And for obvious reasons because he 
had drugs in his pocket and didn't want them discovered. 
We not only have a bulge, but we have lots of other 
things here. We have the defendant upset over something 
that's happened; upset at the officer because they're not 
going to go and pick up his vehicle. He's very nervous 
because the officer mentions a past drug arrest and he's very 
nervous about that. He keeps putting his hands in his 
pockets on several occasions, in spite of the fact that the 
officer said don't do that. 
I think clearly the officer can do the minimal intrusion 
of a frisk to make sure that he's safe while he continues to 
talk to this individual and that's what he attempted to do. 
One again, we never got that far. The frisk was never done. 
This defendant chose to leave the area, to run from the 
officer. So I don't see any grounds whatsoever to suppress 
any evidence based upon the facts that we have here. 
Up until this time the officer was responding :: the 
concerns of the defendant. It's not like he was detaining 
him. The defendant is there trying to get the officer to 
seize his vehicle. So he's not detaining the defendant at 
all. If there was a period of detention it was a matter of a 
few seconds and then he decides to run. 
THE COURT: Isn't there a detention any time you say 
you'll have to wait while I write out the warning ticket? 
MR. BARON: Yeah. And from that time until the time 
he ran the officer said it was 30 seconds, approximately. Up 
until that time they were investigating the stolen vehicle. 
We're not talking about a five or ten minute detention on a 
traffic citation, such as the cases talk about. We're 
talking about a 30 second possible detention while he brings 
out the warning ticket. It's a very minimal, very minimal 
intrusion. I think the officer had every reason to believe 
that he needed to be concerned for his safety and to conduct 
the frisk, even though he wasn't able to do it. That's all. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Bond. 
MR. BOND: Well, I think first and importantly is 
that — it's pretty well settled case law that a detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. And included m that, is 
if there is investigative questioning that detains the driver 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
That's exactly what happened in this case. He's got the 
warning ticket in his hand and he's got his license and 
registration. He doesn't give it back to him. Suddenly he 
starts asking him about these previous charges. He points to 
a marijuana tattoo and asks him if he still uses drugs. He 
says no, I don't. But he goes on and says — and at this 
point he's putting his hand in his pockets, but he's still 
saying can I look this your car? No, I don't want you 
looking in my car. Then he says I want to search you because 
I'm concerned for my safety. 
That right there is exceeding the scope of that stop. 
There is no testimony that there was any criminal activity 
before he started asking about those drugs. Further, there 
was no suspicion or fear for the officer's safety before he 
started asking about those drugs. He stated that on the 
stand. That is clearly beyond the scope of this stop. He 
was merely going to give him a violation and he had the 
ticket ready to go, and all of a sudden he starts asking 
about the drugs. 
Then I have some case law that I found that. One case 
says that the trial court noted -- this is State versus 
Sykes. 
THE COURT: Are these in your memorandum? 
MR. BOND: Yeah. Page five. 
THE COURT: ?age five. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BOND: At the bottom, that last quote, "The 
appellate court held that the trial court noted that the 
bulge under defendant's clothing at waist level and his 
failure to produce identification were inadequate 
circumstances for the officers to have formed a reasonable 
articulable suspicion." Just merely a bulge in somebody's 
pocket they held wasn't sufficient. 
When it comes to the questioning about the prior drug 
case, that can't support a reasonable suspicion of probabie 
cause as the case on my last page states. It says, State 
versus Humphrey, it says, "In addition, the fact that an 
individual previously has been involved in criminal activity 
is not enough. We recognize that consideration of an 
individual's past criminal history is not properly part of a 
probable cause determination." So he asked him about it and 
then he starts to get nervous. He points to the marijuana 
tattoo and he keeps going on and on about it. He doesn't let 
him leave. He has no reason to ask those questions. Those 
investigative questions are beyond the scope of what he saw 
at that point. 
Further, there's one other case that I didn't put in my 
memorandum, but I think you're familiar with these, where 
plenty of those cases that say -- I can provide them to the 
court. They have held that there's lots of reasons that 
people get nervous when they get pulled over. It's always a 
nervous situation. .' 
I think, based on that, there's two things. One, he 
exceeded the scope of the stop by asking those investigative 
questions. That's clearly evident from the case law. Also, 
that bulge in his front pocket is not suspicion -- is not 
grounds for officer safety without something more. 
So we would submit it on that, Your Honor. I believe 
this is clearly a violation of the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Baron? 
MR. BARON: Just a comment. Counsel takes one 
little thing out and says that's not enough. Then he picks 
another little thing out and says that's not enough by 
itself. That's true. You see a bulge, you can't go up to a 
citizen and search him. But if you see ail of these things, 
his demeanor, his extreme nervousness, his looking around as 
if he's looking for a way to escape, keeping putting his 
hands in his pockets even though told not to, you combine all 
of that and, yeah, the bulge isn't enough, but if you have 
something in addition to the bulge it's enough. The 
nervousness isn't enough, but if you have something in 
addition to the nervousness it's enough. 
Counsel wants to go to these individual items, cut AT.er. 
you combine those with everything then certainly we have 
enough that the officer used reasonable — he was reasonable 
if his reactions to that and in trying to do the frisk at 
that point. It's easy for us to try and second guess him 
here today, but we weren't there with this very upset, 
nervous individual who appeared to be trying to get something 
out of his pocket and appeared like he was going to run. 
think it was reasonable. 
MR. BOND: Can I just say one final thing to that? 
If the court remembers what the officer said, when the 
defendant got out of the car he was looking for that truck. 
Apparently that truck was right in the vicinity, because ne 
ran that stop sign trying to get his truck back. So it's 
perfectly logical that he's looking around for that truck. 
It could still be driving around somewhere. He probably 
wanted to see where it went. And he told the officer he naci 
to leave to go get her. It's obvious he was concerned about 
where that truck was. It was right in front of him before he 
got pulled over. 
The second thing about pulling different things cut, I 
think it's important to note that none of that stuff -- there 
was none of those concerns until after he started asking him 
these questions about his prior drug charges and started to 
probe about wantina to look in the car. 
The ctner important thing is that he sees this culge m 
his pocket and says this may be a weapon, but he never as,<s 
the defendant what's in your pocket. He says that he 
remembers arresting him for drugs. There's a marijuana 
tattoo on your shoulder. He puts his hands in and out of his 
pockets and he says can I search your car. Why doesn't he 
ask what's in your pocket? If he's seeing him with his hands 
in his pockets and a bulge, why isn't he asking to check his 
pockets? He asked if he can search the car. There's 
obviously not concern there. They're trying to stretch this 
to make it a concern so they can justify the search. I'll 
submit it on that. 
THE COURT: The court views this as actually a 
fairly close case. As I look at the language that's been 
cited by counsel, State versus Sykes, in that case I note, 
"The trial court noted that the bulge under the defendant's 
clothing at waist level and his failure to produce 
identification were inadequate circumstances for the officer 
to form a reasonable articulable suspicion." 
The distinctions that appear to be in this case are the 
following. There was the bulge actually in the pants pocket, 
which by itself wouldn't be an adequate reasonable suspicion. 
There was the defendant's demeanor, which was described as 
angry, excited, upset. Possibly that wouldn't be sufficient 
m addition because there's excianation for that. He 
explained why he was upset, what was going on and what he was 
agitated about. 
But over the course of this encounter that lasted several 
minutes, he repeatedly put his hand in the pocket where this 
object or bulge was and he was repeatedly told to remove 
them. He did, but then, being aware that the officer didn't 
want those hands there, they kept going back there anyway, 
which in the court's view would give the officer a 
justification for being nervous or uneasy or concerned, 
because normally a person, once they've been told by the 
officer once or twice don't do that, understands that they're 
not supposed to do that, that that's a problem. In this case 
the officer then attempted to do a frisk, but the defendant 
broke and ran. 
For the foregoing reasons the motion to suppress is 
denied, although the court, as I've indicated, it's a close, 
case. The appellate court could look at that and say no, it 
is still the Sykes case. I think this court's view is they'd 
look at it and say no, there's the distinctions. 
MR. BOND: May I ask to have it -- it was originally 
filed as exceeding the scope. Can you explain the findings 
on that for the record? 
THE COURT: Exceeding the scope? During the course 
of the encounter the officer, whether issuing a traffic 
ticket or a warning or anything else, has a right to look out 
for his own personal safety. 
MR. BOND: Okay. 
THE COURT: During the course of that encounter, 
because of the defendant's actions -- and as I say, I think 
this is a close call. But the fact that it was repeated, and 
I donft know how many times, but I have the testimony that 
says repeatedly, which means more than one, more than twice, 
it means a number of times. The hand still goes back into 
that pocket. So the court is basing it on a safety issue. 
MR. BOND: All right. I see. 
THE COURT: Any other questions or matters for 
today? 
MR. BARON: No, not for today, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do we have this at this point scheduled 
for a pretrial conference or is that what we need to do next? 
MR. BARON: I think that's what we need to do next. 
I don't have any notes of anything further scheduled. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Have counsel had some discussions? Do 
you want to do that right now? 
MR. BOND: Yeah, could we? We can talk for a 
second. 
THE COURT: Do you want a couple of minutes recess? 
MR. BOND: Yes. 
THE COURT: Court'sin recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Court is m recess. 
(Short recess . ) 
THE COURT: Counsel, do we need to set a settlement 
conference or a trial or where are we at? 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BOND: I think we've been talking about the bai'. 
in this case. 
THE COURT: Is he being held on any other charges? 
MR. BOND: No, just this. 
THE COURT: Was he initially? 
MR. BOND: No, just this. 
THE COURT: How long has he been in custody? 
MR. BOND: About 30 days. 
MR. BARON: What we've been discussing, Your Honor, 
if he's willing to plead guilty today to a third degree 
felony possession, we've been discussing allowing bail of 
$3,000, either a cash or bail bondsman, on the condition tha* 
he immediately enroll into an intensive outpatient therapy 
program at New Choices and successfully participate in that 
while they're doing the presentence report. 
I'm not sure that he can get a bail bondsman, frankly, 
because he was missing once before. 
THE COURT: Does he have any prospects of family 
helping him on that? 
MR. BOND: I'm sorry, did you ask something? 
THE COURT: I ]us: asKea are there any pr:spe::s 
that the family might be able to come up with the $3,000 
bond? 
MR. BOND: I don't know. He seems to think he can 
make that. 
MR. BARON: That would be conditioned upon him 
entering a guilty plea today to the third degree felony. 
THE COURT: I don't have any -- I don't want the 
defendant to feel like I'm trying to push him to accept 
something or tell him he shouldn't. I am just inquiring if 
there is an agreement or not. 
MR. BOND: I think we're ready to do that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bond, why don't we have 
you and your client step up to the podium for a minute. 
Mr. Nish, we'll go through a number of questions. I'll 
ask your attorney some questions and then you. I have to 
make sure that you understand what you're doing in entering a 
guilty plea. 
MR. BARON: Your Honor, may I have the file so I can 
make the changes? 
THE COURT: All right. Has the current charge been 
explained to the defendant, or charges? 
MR. BOND: They have. 
THE COURT: Now, is count two to be dismissed? 
MR. BARON: Yes, Your Honor. That's fine. 
THE COURT: Have you reviewed with the defendant his 
constitutional rights as relate to these proceedings? 
MR. BOND: I've asked him about it and he said he 
understood about his right to trial and that he'll be giving 
up his right to a trial. 
THE COURT: I'll review the other rights in a 
moment. Mr. Nish, do you feel that you understand your 
constitutional rights? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the attorney -- does 
counsel feel that the plea that the defendant is about to 
enter is knowing, voluntary and with an understanding of its 
consequences? 
MR. BOND: I believe it is. 
THE COURT: Do you know of any reason he should not 
accept this agreement under the terms that have been 
negotiated? 
MR. BOND: I do not. 
THE COURT: In your opinion, does the defendant 
understand the effect and meaning of pleading guilty? 
MR. BOND: I believe he does. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nish, have you understood what we've 
said so far today in this hearing? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you need more time to talk with him 
before we go forward? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you intend to plead guilty to the 
amended charge, to a third degree felony? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you presently under the influence of 
any alcohol or drugs? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you suffering from any physical or 
mental illness which would interfere with your ability to 
understand things? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the 
right to plead not guilty? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you plead guilty you have certain 
rights which you'll be waiving, including the following. 
These are your constitutional rights. You have the right to 
a speedy trial before an impartial jury. You have the right 
to counsel, either appointed for you or retained by you. You 
have the right to confront and cross-examine the state's 
witnesses and to present a defense in your own behalf. You 
have the right against self-incrimination. You have the 
right to compel witnesses to appear in court and .testify in 
your behalf at no cost to you. You have the right of 
requiring that the state prove your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If you were convicted following a trial, you would 
have the right to appeal the conviction. If you plead guilty 
you waive all of these rights I've just identified. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to waive those rights? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The state would be required to prove 
each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
With regards to count one as amended, that the defendant did 
knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled 
substance, to whit, methamphetamine. Is that an accurate 
statement? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr'. Baron, I've heard the testimony this 
morning, but we didn't hear all of it. Can you make a brief 
summary of the evidence that would be presented at trial? 
MR. BARON: I will, Your Honor. The defendant was 
pulled over for running a stop sign. Then we heard what 
happened with regard to the possible stolen vehicle and the 
questioning. The defendant then ran from the area. The 
officer pursued him. Without going into all the details, he 
finally got to a fence that ne can not climb over. The 
officer saw him do what appeared to be throwing something 
over the fence. He was then sprayed with something like a 
Mace spray and taken into custody. 
The officer later looked in the area where it appeared ne 
had thrown something and found a syringe and a homemade light 
bulb used for consuming methamphetamine. Tests were run and 
it was found that these items did in fact have 
methamphetamine contained in them. That's all. 
THE COURT: Is that an accurate summary of what 
happened? 
MR. NISH: (Nodded his head.) 
THE COURT: You need to answer out loud because 
we're recording today. 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
MR. BOND: Can I ask Roger one thing? 
THE COURT: Yes. While he's asking I'll explain 
that this is a third degree felony as amended. That means 
that it is punishable by a term of zero to five years at tne 
Utah State Prison and a fine of up to $5,000. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. NISH: (Nodded his head.) 
THE COURT: We'll wait for counsel here before we 
continue. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BOND: All right. We're ready. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nish, you understand that you can 
appeal a conviction if you were to plead not guilty, is that 
clear to you? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
MR. BOND: Actually, I've talked to Roger and we've 
discussed and agreed that this would be a conditional guilty 
plea in case we decide to appeal it. 
THE COURT: All right. You're preserving the 
court's ruling made earlier on the suppression issue? 
MR. BOND: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Is that your agreement, Mr. Baron? 
MR. BARON: It is, Your Honor. Frankly, I think 
this is -- this particular set of facts is something that may 
come up again, this type of thing, and I wouldn't mind having 
an appellate decision on it anyway. 
MR. BOND: Can I have the minutes reflect that and 
can I ask the judgment to reflect that when you do it? 
THE COURT: I think it would be well if that was 
included in the judgment. Then there won't be some confusion 
down the road. 
MR. BOND: All right. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nish, do you need any more time to 
confer with your attorney? 
MR. NISH: No. 
THE COURT: Ail rignt. nave there been any premises 
made to you other than what I've been told about here m ~he 
courtroom? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand that I haven't made any 
agreement or any promise as to what the sentence would be, is 
that clear to you? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Has anyone used any threats, any 
intimidation, somehow tried to force you to plead guilty? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are 
in fact guilty of this charge as amended? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to 
ask either your attorney or this court before you enter the 
plea? 
MR. NISH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: As to the charge in the information as 
amended, possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, Tremonton, Utah, July 13th, 2000, how do you plead? 
MR. NISH: Guilty. 
THE COURT: The court will accept the guilty plea. 
It appears be freely and voluntarily made with an 
understanding of its consequences. You may seek for gccd 
cause shown to withdraw that plea within 30 days from today's 
date. If you don't make such a request within 30 days, you 
forfeit that right. 
You have the right to be sentenced in not less than two 
nor more than 45 days from today's date. Counsel, I would 
propose sentencing for March 13th. That's actually going to 
be 47 days out, so we'd need a waiver in order to do that. 
If he doesn't want to waive I'll find an earlier date. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Are you willing to waive that 45 day 
sentencing requirement? 
MR. NISH: For two days, yeah. Just a couple of 
days extra? 
THE COURT: Yeah. The way we're scheduling it it 
will be 47 days out. That's why I need the waiver. Is that 
acceptable to you? 
MR. NISH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: We'll schedule the sentencing for March 
13th, 9 a.m. I'll direct that Adult Probation prepare a 
presentence report. And if the defendant is released from 
custody he needs to understand that it's his responsibility 
to go to Adult Probation and Parole immediately and get that 
report started. Cooperate with them and give them any 
information they need. 
MR. NISH: So as soon as I get out I go to AP&?? 
1 THE COURT: Yes, tnat's the first place you go. 
2 Now, if you don't get out they'll come and visit with you 
3 down there and get the report done. But if you are cut you 
4 have to go to them. 
5 MR. BARON: According to the agreement, he also has 
6 to go to New Choices immediately and sign up for their 
7 intensive program there. 
8 MR. NISH: If I'm in Cache Valley, in Logan, can I 
9 do my -- I mean, do they have a New Choices over there in 
10 Logan or do I have to come clear over back to Brigham to do 
11 it? 
12 THE COURT: Where were you living before you were 
13 arrested? 
14 MR. NISH: I was living in Tremonton before I was 
15 arrested. Now, I believe, I'll be staying in Cache Vaiiey. 
16 THE COURT: I'll allow the agencies to work that 
17 out. I'll require that you at least begin the process with 
18 ,ew Choices here and with Adult Probation here. If they 
19 choose to transfer it to their counterpart in Cache Valley, 
20 it's okay with me, but you have to have them decide that. 
21 MR. NISH: So start here in Brigham first? 
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR. BOND: Actually, how they work that out, in 
24 Cache they give money -- they have money available for 
25 inpatient programs. In Box Eider they don't have that money 
They use that money for the outpatient programs. So they dia 
away with the funding for inpatient programs for people who 
can't afford it here. They didn't in Cache, so they don't 
have an outpatient intensive program in Cache. 
THE COURT: So he'll probably have to do it all 
here, but I won't dictate that. If there's some way to do it 
in Cache I'm not opposed to it. 
All right. The court will accept the terms as proposed. 
The defendant may be released pending sentencing upon his 
posting a $3,000 bail and upon his complying with an 
intensive outpatient drug treatment program. Any violations 
of that program or any failures to participate would be 
grounds for revoking the release from custody. 
Anything else? 
MR. BOND: No. 
MR. BARON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nish, this gives you an opportunity 
now. Some of this -- a lot of this is up to you. I hope you 
do well. Court's in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess. 
(Concluded at 12:10 o.m.) 
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